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Trends and Cycles in Productivity,
it Unit Costs, and Prices:
ght An International Perspective






This chapter examines short-run cyclical changes in productivity,
of costs, prices, and profits in the United States and other industrialized
countries in recent decades, as well as in the current recession. It also
analyzes long-term trends in productivity, compensation, costs, and
prices for their implications about levels of inflation and real earnings.
Theoretical speculation into the causes of business cycles has often
centered on the notion that imbalances among productivity, cost,
and price changes are a significant part of the process of cumulative
change by which one set of business conditions transforms itself into
another set. That these factors were important to an understanding
of cyclical changes in market-oriented economies was the subject of
discussion as far back as 1913. Many decades elapsed before statistics
that securely supported this insight arrived on the scene. In recent
years, however, several of the larger industrial countries have begun
to publish quarterly data on productivity, costs, prices, and profits.
The section on short-mn cyclical changes summarizes the salient
• findings on the relationships among these key variables.
The chapter also considers in more detail the disinflation processes
currently affecting U. S. economic activity. Movements in hourly
compensation, output per hour, and various measures of costs, prices,
and profits during the 1981-1982 recession are compared with the
This chapter was presented at the American Enterprise Institute's conference
on "International Comparisons of Productivity and Causes of the Slowdown."
t Washington,D.C., September 30, 1982.




averageof changes for the six recessions from 1948 to 1980. Reces-
sions start out with an imbalance between costs and prices that grows ear
worse for a time and damages the outlook for profits. However, the tw
recession itself brings about a realignment as business enterprises neg
strive to reduce costs. Once costs are rising less rapidly than prices, anc
the outlook for profitable expansion of sales and output improves, use
and this sets the stage for recovery. All of this suggests that economic del
recovery hinges as much on an upturn in price/labor cost ratios as
upon the much talked about decline in interest rates. duc
The section dealing with short-run cyclical changes also reveals a is u
close link between movements in productivity and movements in the ean
leading indicators. One can think of causal links running in both
directions. For example, an upswing in new orders, one of the lead- feat
ing indicators,is likely to lead to an improvement in output per
: sou
hour, because the additional output generated by the orders can mei
often be "oduced without a commensurate increase in labor input. Am
One the other hand, an improvement in productivity, generated by grai
new capital investment, can reduce costs and prices and thereby stim- hov
ulate orders. Statistics depicting this linkage are provided for the co
United States, United Kingdom, West Germany, and Japan. 191
Productivity gains in the industrial countries were generally slower 197
in the 1970s than in the 1960s or before. Statistics are provided doe- sect
umenting this trend, using 1973 as the dividing line. Data on trends of I
in wages, labor costs, prices, and real earnings are presented for seven iror
countries. It is plain that the international productivity slowdown had
did not retard the gains in nominal wages in most countries. In five toga
of the seven countries studied, wage gains in manufacturing indus- con
tries were higher, not lower, after 1973. The exceptions were West pre
Germany and Japan. The consequence, except for those two, was an on
extraordinary acceleration in labor costs per unit of output. The sta- mar
tistics reveal that countries with the largest increases in unit labor fuel
costs generally had the largest increases in prices, especially during exa:
1973—1980. Growth rates in real earnings were lower in the 1973- pro.
1980 period in every country except the United Kingdom. rece
Additional evidence about these long-term relationships is devel- 1on
aped by measuring growth rates from one business cycle peak to the for
next. The data cover the nonfarm business sector in the United
States since 1948. In every one of the business cycles, the gains in CYC
nominalhourly compensation exceeded the gain in output per hour.
The differential diminished in the first three cycles, but increased W
afterwards, reaching dramatic heights in the last two cycles. This U
growing disparity showed up, of course,. in unit labor costs. A tight T
relation between inflation in costs and inflation in prices was main- ofte
tamed throughout. costTrends and Cycles in Productivity, Unit Costs, and Prices 247
ces- Finally, this chapter examines the long-lasting marriage of real
ws earnings and productivity. Official statistics suggest that in the last
the two cycles, those since 1973, changes in real compensation were
ises negative, even though productivity increased slightly. This discrep-
ces, ancy, however, may reflect a problem with the consumer price index
yes, used to calculate real earnings. When nominal hourly compensation is
mic deflated by three other price indexes that have some claim to rele-
s as vance, the rates of increase in real compensation match those in pro-
ductivity growth more closely than when the consumer price index
us a is used. The results cast doubt on the widely accepted view that real
the earnings have declined in recent years.
oth Sustained long-term economic growth has been the most striking
ad- feature of U. S. business history. Growth in labor and capital re-
per sources fueled a substantial part of this growth. Secular improve-
can ments in the use of these resources also accounted for a large part.
ut. Americans have generally taken these productivity improvements for
by granted. A cursory examination of the economic record of the 1970s,
im- however, is sufficient to dispel anyone's continuing inclination to
the complacency on this matter. That decade was the worst since 1901—
1910 in terms of the growth in output per hour. Specifically, from
er 1971 to 1980, labor productivity in the private, nonfarm business
oc- sector grew only 9 percent, which was well below its growth in any
nds of the preceding six decades. This development constituted a cruel
yen irony, since in the 1960s some of the nation's ablest economists
)wn had thoroughly analyzed the problem of economic growth and put
five together extensive menus on how to stimulate faster growth. The
lus- consequences of the dismal productivity performance made an im-
lest pression on the growth of output, on the growth of real earnings, and
an on the behavior of costs and prices. The poor productivity perfor-
sta- mance was not a problem unique to America. The same ailment af-
bor flicted every major industrial economy. In this chapter, we first
ring examine short-run cyclical changes in productivity, costs, prices, and
73— profits in the United States and other industrialized economies in
recent decades, as well as in the current recession. We then analyze
vel- long-term trends in productivity, compensation, costs, and prices




ed Mitchell's Generalizations and Recent
lhis U.S.Business Cycles
ght Theoretical speculation into the etiology of the business cycle has
ain- often centered on the notion that imbalances among productivity,
cost, and price changes are a significant part of the process of cum-248 Inflation
ulativechange by which one set of business conditions transforms
itself into another set. Wesley C. Mitchell, for instance, recognized as
far back as 1913 that these factors were important to an understand-
ing about cyclical changes in market. oriented economies.' His theo-
retical insights were widely discussed in the United States but many
decades elapsed before statistics that securely supported his position
arrived on the scene.2 In 1972, the U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics
began to publish quarterly data on costs and profits per unit of out-
put for all nonfinancial corporations along with comparable prices
received. The BLS series were carried back to 1948 and they now
cover seven full business cycles. In each of these cycles, the changes
in these variables bear a family resemblance to those which Mitchell
described almost seventy years ago.
Let us summarize Mitchell's views and then look at what has hap-
pened during recent business cycles. Mitchell suggested that in the
later stages of economic expansion an encroachment of costs on
prices occurred which paved the way for an eventual squeeze on
aggregate profits. These developments were crucial to an understand-
ing of the reluctance of business firms to commit themselves to new
investment projects. This hesitancy to undertake new investments
itself then contributed to the forces responsible for turning expan-
sion into recession. In contrast, a reversal of this occurs during reces-
sions and this helps to brake the cumulative process of contraction
and bring about an upturn.
Figure 16—1 offers us a glimpse of the movements of these statis-
tics in recent decades. The salient findings on this subject as they
now appear to stand are as follows:
1.For nonfarm businesses as a whole, the rates of increase of unit
labor costs and of prices received have generally tracked one
another closely. (See Figure 16—la.)
2.There have been important divergences, however. Shortly before
and during each of the recessions (shaded area), unit labor costs
rose more 'rapidly than prices, whereas in the early stages of each
of the recoveries, unit labor costs rose more slowly than prices.
The arithmetic differences between the growth rates in prices and
unit labor costs are shown in Figure 16-lb.
3.The differences between price changes and unit labor cost
changes follow a cyclical pattern, which is retlected in corporate
profit margins (Figure 16-ib). In general, profit margins tend to
fall late in economic expansions and during recessions, as busi-
nesses fail to pass through to prices some of the sharp increases
they experience in unit labor costs. In contrast, margins tend to
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Figure 16—1.Growth Rates in Labor Costs, Prices, Profits, and Productivity,
Nonfarm Business— United States.
IA. UNIT LABOR COSTS AND PRICES
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(Figure 76- 7. continued overleaf)I
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Figure 16-1. continued
















4.The reasons for the behavior of unit labor costs can be seen when
cost is subdivided into its two components: average hourly corn- tot
pensation and output per hour (Figure 16-ic). During the late
states of contraction and the early stages of economic expansions Tl
rapid increases in output per hour occur along with a relatively no
slow rise in hourly compensation. Hence, changes in labor costs no
per unit of product fall. In contrast, as the economy approaches rat
a peak, changes in output per hour usually decline. (For details, no
see Table 16-1.) At about that time, hourly compensation gener- ne
ally grows more rapidly. When growth in hourly compensation Eel
exceeds the increase in output per hour, changes in unit costs flu
advance. me
tre,
Mitchell'sGeneralizations and Growth Cycles the
In Europe and Japan the
Anothertest of the power of Mitchell's generalizations, which has tre
both scientific value and practical advantages, can be made by corn- the
piling relevant statistics in other countries and conducting similar tha
experiments with them. If similar relationships are revealed, the case run
for the theory would obviously be strengthened. However, finding a
similar testing ground for the theory elsewhere is a bit more difficult COS
than it might at first appear. As noted earlier, the U.S. tests were ma
conducted inside the framework of the business or classical cycle. anc





1st Half2nd Half 1st Half2nd Half
Averages
1919—1961 (10 cycles) 0.8 2.8 5.3 3.0
1961—1982 (4 cycles) —1.9 1.4 3.2 0.7
Individual cycles
1961 -1969 (E)a
1969—1970 (C)b 1.2 1.4
3.6 1.6
1970—1973 (E) 3.9 1.9
1973-1975 (C) -2.9 -0.4
1975-1980 (E) 3.4 —0.1
1980 -1980 (C) -2.8 3.2




Source: The data for 1919—1961 relate to the manufacturing secrnr and are
monthly; see Solomon Fabricant, A Primer on Productivity New York: Random
House, 1969), p. 91. The data for 1961-1982 are for the nonfarm business sec-
tor and are compiled quarterly by the Bureau of Labor Statistics.
This framework involves an absolute rise and fall in aggregate eco-
nomic activity. In the 1950s and 1960s, however, many countries did
not experience actual declines in activity but did experience varying
rates of growth. When the work on international economic indicators
now being conducted at the Columbia Center for International Busi-
ness Cycle Research was first launched at the National Bureau of
Economic Research in 1973, the task was to learn more about these
fluctuations. To examine these growth cycles, therefore, methods of
measuring and eliminating long-run trends were developed. From the
trend-adjusted data, chronologies of growth cycles were derived in
the same manner that had been used in the United States to derive
the business cycle chronology. The growth cycle then is simply a
trend-adjusted business cycle. The expansion phase is a period when
the short-run growth rate of aggregate economic activity is greater
than the long-run rate, whereas in the contraction phase the short-
run growth rate is less than the long-run rate.
Figures 16-2, 16-3, and 16-4 disclose information about labor
costs, productivity, and prices for the United Kingdom, West Ger-
many, and Japan within a growth cycle framework. The peak (P)
and trough (T) dates identify periods of slowdown in economic























Figure 16—2. Growth Rates in Labor Costs, Prices, Profits, and Productivity
in Manufacturing—United Kingdom.
2A. UNIT LABOR COSTS AND PRICES
p
growth in each country, not necessarily periods of recession. The
salient findings for the three countries are as follows:
1.Although each country has its own pattern, the close relationship 4.
between rates of change in labor cost per unit of product and in







I *Figure 16-2. continued




2C. MONEY WAGES AND PRODUCTIVITY











2.For the three countries, unit labor costs rose faster than prices
during each of the growth recessions since 1963. The encroach-
ment process, however, started to take hold before the growth
recessions in only seven of the twelve episodes.3 Although this
differs from the universal drop before U. S. business cycles it
should be borne in mind that growth cycle peaks typically occur
before business cycle peaks.
3.Changes in profit margins in Japanese factories since 1963 moved
downward before each of the growth cycle peaks and reached
negative values—that is, margins were falling—no later than one
quarter after the growth cycle peak in any case. Moreover, lows
of changes in profit margins preceded each of the growth cycle
troughs. For the United Kingdom and West Germany we have
unfortunately been unable to locate data on profit margins. As
a proxy, we have computed changes in total profits for the
United Kingdom and in total entrepreneurial and property in-
come for Germany. In the United Kingdom highs in the rate of
change in profits preceded each of the growth cycle peaks, and
lows occurred before growth cycle troughs. At about the same
time growth cycle lows were reached, total profits were again
rising. Corresponding statistics on changes in the West German
series are more erratic, and it is difficult to find more than traces
of the cyclical pattern that shows up clearly in the price/cost
differences.
4.During the early stages of growth cycle expansions, rapid in-
creases in output per hour occur, along with a slowing of the rise
in compensation; hence, increases in unit costs fall. In contrast,
I-
636465666?686970 71721374757677787980 818283changes in output per hour typically decline as a growth cycle
peak is approached, while hourly compensation grows more rap-
idly. When the growth in hourly compensation exceeds that in














Figure 16—3.Growth Rates in Labor Costs, Prices, Profits, and Productivity
Fi































I Summingup these relationships, costs are generally rising more
rapidly than prices when a slowdown or recession begins, but their
differences diminish during recessions. By the time a recovery begins
they are usually in much closer alignment.
A principal function of economic history, which studies changes
under various sets of institutional arrangements, is to test the rele-
-15
vanceof economic generalizations and to ask which are the more
widely and which are the more narrowly applicable. The historical
analysis we have summarized covers a long span of U.S. history and
IS goesfar beyond our boundaries to discover new testing grounds in
the United Kingdom, West Germany, Japan, and other countries.
Few economic generalizations have been accorded as much testing as
Mitchell's views on the cyclical behavior of costs and profits. Still
fewer have been able to survive tests of this sort for so long a period.
Recession-Recovery Patterns
Wenow turn to materials that disclose a few of the features of the
disinflation processes currently affecting U.S. economic activity. Fig-
ure 16-5 depicts the movements of hourly compensation, output per
hour, and various measures of costs, prices, and profits for the
months before and after the business cycle peak in July 1981. The
data are plotted in what is known as a recession-recovery format.4256 Inflation
Fj1
4C
Figure 16—4. Growth Rates in Labor Costs, Prices, Profits, and Productivity
in Manufacturing—Japan.
4A.UNITLABOR COSTS AND PRICES







































The growth rates displayed are two -quartersmoothed changes; that
is, the growth rate is derived from the ratio of the current quarter's
index to the average index for the four preceding quarters. This cal-
culation is designed to smooth out the irregularities in the short -term
movements of the various statistics. The railroad track line displays
the average pattern of the series during six preceding recessions,
1948—1980. The solid line represents the movements of the respec-
tive series during the current recession.
It is plain that the rate of gain in nominal hourly compensation
during the 1981-1982 downswing has fallen more sharply than dur-
ing earlier contractions. Hourly compensation was rising at a 9 per-
cent annual rate at the 1981 peak. A year later, it was increasing at a
less than 7 percent rate. The decline to date has been more than
twice as large as the average decline in previous recessions.
The slowdown in the growth of hourly pay has helped to slow the
growth of labor cost per unit of product. At first, however, unit
labor costs rose more rapidly, owing to the sharp decline in produc-
tivity growth when the recession got underway. The decline in private
nonfarm productivity was much sharper than the typical change that
occurs in the early stages of economic contraction. Hence, unit cost
accelerated during the first.six months of the downswing. Since then,
however, unit cost changes have followed a path similar to that dur-
ing comparable phases of earlier recessions.
Figure 16-4. continued
6364656667686970 717273747576777879808182
Note: Peak(P) and trough (T) dates identify periods of slowdown in economic growth.258 Inflation 1
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(Figure 16—5. continued overleaf)
Figure 16—5. continued
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1/83Figure 16-5. continued
AVERAGE1 SIX RECESSIONS, 1948-80 Note:



















-6 -4 -202468 1012141618 20 22 24
MONTHS FROM BUSINESS CYCLE PEAK
1/81rn/SI 1/82 111/821/83






























-6 -4 —20246810121416IS 20 22 24
MONTHS FROM BUSINESS CYCLE PEAK
1/81 111/81 r/82 111/821/83









52Trends and Cycles in Productivity, Unit Costs, and Prices 261
Figure 16-5. continued
Note: Datapertain to the rionfarm business sector except for f(all nonfinancial corpora-
tions) and h (entire employed population).
r
5G. REAL HOURLY COMPENSATION,GROWTH RATE
(DEFLATED BY CPI-X) PERCENT
-J III I1I 111111
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Thecharts also reveal the striking changes in prices that occurred a rem
early in the economic slide. At that time, the inflation rate fell like all re
a rock. The decline in the growth of prices working in conjunction provi
with the stickiness of the cost changes served to prolong and intensify Th
the encroachment of costs on prices that began, as usual, during the the a
preceding economic upswing. Thus, the price/unit labor cost ratio has b
continued its downward slide through the second quarter of 1982, a Ther
big factor in the decline of profit margins. Since then, both the ratio On th
and margins have increased. Another implication of the sharp decline positi
in the rate of price inflation, which affected the economic well-being of ur
of the close to 100 million employed persons, is disclosed in the expei
movements of the changes in real hourly earnings. A sharp increase in labor
real hourly compensation occurred about six months after the busi-
ness cycle peak in the summer of 1981 (see discussion on page 272). Th
Normally, real earnings do not start to increase until about a year an
after a recession has started. This increase has helped to offset some WE
of the decline in income produced by the drop in employment, since lrnke
real income has increased for those who remained employed. \WE
Every economist knows that there are only two ways to increase migh
the real earnings of labor. They can be raised by (1) increasing out- close
put per hour of work, or (2) enlarging the share of total income that of re
goes to wage and salary workers. The first of these two sources is of ca
basic and will be addressed in our discussion of long-term trends. In UPSW
the short run, however, business firms in the aggregate may not be to an
able to increase their prices as rapidly as hourly rates of pay are ris- gener
ing. Hence, real hourly earnings will increase. withc
During the 1981—1982 recession, although real hourly compensa- an in
tion fell slightly at the start, there was a rapid quickening of real corn- ment
pensation afterward. In the second quarter, this series rose at a Fi
2 percent annual rate. Not only that, as suggested earlier this is tiOflS
associated with an enlargement of the share of total income that goes m pr
to the workers. The latter effect can be seen in the lagging economic corre
indicator, compensation of employees as a percent of national in- faste:
come, which has risen of late (see Figure 16-5h). Indeed, in the by ft
first half of 1982, workers' share in the national income, at 76 per- leadi
cent, was higher than in any preceding six-month period save one. busin
In his masterpiece on business cycles published in 1939, Joseph move
Schumpeter propounded the remarkable proposition that periods of mcid
recession are times when the harvest is gathered after the strenuous prod
efforts of the expansion.5 Sympathetic students of his work have rates
usually looked at this proposition with bemusement, as something ducti
better overlooked since it would only detract from the respect that
his work rightfully deserves. But Schumpeter's formulation is at least in eTrends and Cycles in Productivity, Unit Costs, and Prices 263
ed a reminder to us that business cycle recessions are not catastrophes in
like all respects. The data on changes in real hourly earnings just cited
tion provide some perspective on this matter.
The figures tell still another story that perhaps has not received
the the attention it deserves. During the past year, the public's attention
tio has been focused on the high level of nominal and real interest rates.
2 a There has been enormous speculation about the impact of these rates
at'io on the prospects for economic recovery. There is justification for this
dine position. However, scant attention if any is focused on the behavior
eing of unit labor costs and their relation to prices. Judging from past
the experience, economic recovery hinges as much on an upturn in price!
e in labor cost ratios as upon a decline in interest rates.
TheLink between Productivity
ea andthe Leading Indicators
me We have seen that short-run movements in productivity are closely
ince linked to costs, prices, and profits, which in turn have long been
viewed as crucial factors in the generation of business cycles. One
ease might expect, therefore, that productivity movements would show a
out- close affinity to the so -called leading indicators, which for a variety
that of reasons anticipate business cycle peaks and troughs. One can think
es is of causal relationships running in both directions. For example, an
In upswing in new orders, one of the leading indicators, is likely to lead
t be to an improvement in output per hour, because the additional output
generated by the larger volume of orders can usually be produced
without a commensurate increase in labor input. On the other hand,
nsa- an improvement in productivity generated, say, by new capital equip-
om- ment, can reduce costs and prices and thereby stimulate orders.
at a Figure 16—6 supplies a test of the strength of this two -way rela-
i is tionship, comparing growth rates in leading indexes with growth rates
goes in productivity in four countries. In each country there is a general
pmic correspondence between the movements of the two series. Thus,
jin- faster growth in a country's leading index is likely to be accompanied
the by faster growth in output per hour. Slower growth or decline in the
•per- leading index and in productivity also go together. Both lead general
business activity, and by about the same amount of time; that is, the
eph movements of the leading indexes and productivity are roughly co-
s of incident with one another. More often than not, in fact, the turns in
productivity growth have preceded those in the leading index growth
iave rates by a few months, again attesting to the significant role of pro-
king ductivity in the business cycle.
that One of the practical values of this relationship is that the leading
1east indexes can help appraise current movements in productivity. For264 Inflation
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Note:Peak(P1 and trough (TI dates identify periods of slowdown ri economic growth.266 Inflation
example,the striking improvement in productivity growth in the
United Kingdom since 1980 seems to be firmly based, since the
growth rates in the U.K. leading index have risen substantially from
their low at the end of 1980. In most countries, the leading indexes
are available several months before productivity data are published,
so the former give some advance indications of movements in the
latter.
LONG-RUNTRENDS
Asnoted earlier, productivity gains in the industrial countries have
been generally slower in the 1970s than in the 1960s or before. Fig-
ure 16-7 documents this trend, using 1973 as the dividing line, and
displays the concommitant trends in wages, labor costs, prices, and
real earnings, along the lines developed in John Kendrick's recent
work.6 Except for prices, where we use the consumer price index, all
the data pertain to the manufacturing sector.
One thing the international productivity slowdown did not do was
to retard the gains in nominal wages. In five of the seven countries,
wage gains in manufacturing industries were higher, not lower, after
1973. Only in West Germany and Japan did wage gains follow the
productivity trend. The consequence, in every country except West
Germany and Japan, was an extraordinary acceleration in labor cost
per unit of output. A further consequence was a faster rise in prices,
because labor costs constitute a big proportion of total costs in most
industries. Although reductions in profit margins and other costs can
temporarily offset some of the increases in labor costs, in the long
run, rising labor costs get passed through to prices.7
A comparison of the bars in Figure 16-7c and d reveals that coun-
tries with the largest increases in unit labor costs generally had the
largest increases in prices, especially during 1973-1980. The United
Kingdom and Italy are well above the rest in both cost arid price
increases. West Germany and Japan share the honors for the smallest
increases in both costs and prices. They were the countries whose
wage trends during the past eight years came closest to matching
their reduced productivity growth.
As for real hourly earnings, growth rates were lower in the 1973—
1980 period than in the previous period in every country except the
United Kingdom (Figure 16-7e). The reduction in real wage gains —
forthe United States and Japan were conspicuously sharp. The enor-
mous acceleration in money wages did not pay off in real terms. As
has been established time and again, productivity growth holds the






















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Furtherevidence buttressing those long-run trend relationships is
displayed in Figure 16-8. Here the method of putting to one side the
short-run cyclical changes is to measure growth rates from one busi-
ness cycle to the next. The data cover the nonfarm business sector in
the United States since 1948. Hence the industry coverage and time
span is wider than in the preceding charts, while the geographic coy-
erage is narrower.
In every one of the seven business cycles, the gains in hourly corn-
pensation in nominal terms exceeded the gains in output per hour
(Figure 16—8a). In the first three cycles, from 1948 to 1960, the dif-
ferential diminished. Then it increased, reaching dramatic heights in
the last two cycles, 1973-1980 and 1980-1981. Over the entire
period the relationship between growth in hourly wages and in pro-
ductivity was, if anything, inverse. Perhaps "perverse" would be a E
better word.
This growing disparity between wages and productivity in the
1960s and 1970s showed up, of course, in unit labor costs (Figure
16-8b). The tight relation between inflation in costs and inflation in
prices was maintained throughout. Whatever the ultimate source of
inflation, costs and prices go together.
Finally, in Figure 16 -8c, we return once again to the long-lasting
marriage of real earnings and productivity. As productivity goes, so 3
goreal earnings. This time, however, there is a slight twist. In the c
firsttwo cycles, real earnings growth exceeded productivity growth.
In the last five cycles, since 1957, real earnings growth fell short of
productivity growth.
The reasons for this twist are worth further exploration. On the
face of it, the inflation in nominal wages had a negative payoff. Not
only did the gains in real earnings decline as productivity slowed, :
theydid not even keep up with productivity. In fact, in the last two
cycles, since 1973, changes in real earnings were negative, even
though productivity increased slightly. This decline in real earnings,
however, may reflect a problem with the consumer price index,
which is used to calculate real earnings. To examine this matter, we
have deflated hourly earnings with three other price indexes that
have some claith to relevance, with the results shown in Figures -E
16—8d, e, and f. We find that in all three instances, the rates of in-
crease in real compensation match those in productivity growth more
closely than when the consumer price index is used. Moreover, all
three of the alternative measures show that real earnings increased
since 1973, albeit slowly.
One can argue, of course, about the relative merits of the various
price deflators. CPI -xmeasureshousing costs in terms of a rental
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equivalentconcept, and is to be adopted by the BLS as the official
CPI for the urban population after January 1983. The personal con-
sumption expenditures deflator also uses a rental equivalent concept.
In addition, it is affected by changes in the composition of consumer
spending. The selling price index, which is the implicit price deflator
for nonfarm business output, is the same deflator that is used to
derive the productivity estimates. These prices are not the prices that
wage earners pay, but this measure of real earnings does represent the
amount of industry's output that could be purchased with an hour's
compensation. All of the alternative price deflators support the con-
clusion that real earnings have increased in recent years about in line
with productivity growth.
NOTESTO CHAPTER 16
1.Wesley C.Mitchell,Business Cycles and Their Causes, (Berkeley: Univer-
sity of California Press, 1941).
2. Empirical support for the hypothesis was first developed by Thor Hultgren
in "Cyclical Diversities in the Fortunes of Industrial Corporations," Occasional
Paper 32 (New York: National Bureau of Economic Research, 1952). Stronger
support was then provided in Thor Hultgren, Costs, Prices, and Profits: Their
Cyclical Relations, Studies in Business Cycles, no. 14 (New York: 1965). The
results of still other tests were disclosed in Geoffrey H. Moore's "Tested Knowl-
edge of Business Cycles," 42nd Annual Report, (New York: National Bureau of
Economic Research, 1962), as well as in Moore's "Productivity, Costs, and
Prices: New Light From an Old Hypothesis," Explorations in Economic Research
2,no. 1, (Winter 1975). See also Anthony T. Cluff's doctoral dissertation,
"Prices, Unit Labor Costs, and Profits—An Examination of Wesley C. Mitchell's
Business Cycle Theory for the Period 1947-1969," (George Washington Uni-
versity, June 1970). Findings about the validity of the hypothesis beyond U.S.
boundaries are found in Philip A. Klein and Geoffrey H. Moore, "Monitoring
Profits During Business Cycles," in Helmut Laumer and Maria Ziegler, eds., In-
ternational Research on Business Cycles (Aldershot: 1981). Gower Publishing.
3. Three of the five exceptions occurred at the start of the 1973—197 5 world.
wide downturn when the price runups associated with the activities of the OPEC
cartel doubtless were a contributing factor to the deviation from the usual
sequence.
4. For further information on recession-recovery patterns, see Recession-
Recovery Watch, a bimonthly publication of the Center for International Busi-
ness Cycle Research, Rutgers University. See also Gerhard Bry and Charlotte
Boschan, Cyclical Analysis of Time Series: Selected Procedures and Computer
Programs, National Bureau of Economic Research, (New York: Columbia Uni-
versity Press, 1971), pp. 151—199.




6.John Kendrick,"InternationalComparisons of Recent Productivity
Trends," in Contemporary Economic Problems, 1981 -1 982 Edition, William
Feilner, Project Director, (Washington, D.C.: American Enterprise Institute,
1981), pp. 125—170.
7. Some students of economic policy drew a distinction between demand-
pull and cost.push inflation that suggested that the former was a monetary phe.
nomenon while the latter was nonmonetary. In reality, both types of inflation
are monetary in the important sense that they require monetary expansion.
Either M, the quantity of money, or V, its velocity of circulation, must go up.
Demand-pull, as well as cost-push inflations, are phenomena that can be stopped
or prevented by monetary restrictions. In modern industrial economies, price
and wage policymakers often operate on the basis of an important tacit assump-
tion that monetary policy will accomodate pricing or wage bargains that they
arrange. The notion that their actions might be incompatible with moderate
rates of expansion in the money supply is not often considered.
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